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Abstract
This paper concerns pernicious predictive inferences: taking someone to be likely to possess a
socially disvalued trait based on statistical information about the prevalence of that trait within a
social group to which she belongs. Some scholars have argued that pernicious predictive
inferences are morally prohibited, but are sometimes epistemically required, leaving us with a
tragic conflict between the requirements of epistemic rationality and those of morality. Others
have responded by arguing that pernicious predictive inferences are sometimes epistemically
prohibited. The present paper takes a different approach, considering the sort of reluctance to
draw pernicious predictive inferences that seems morally praiseworthy and vindicating its
epistemic status. We argue that even on a simple orthodox Bayesian picture of the requirements
of epistemic rationality, agents must consider the costs of error — including the associated moral
and political costs — when forming and revising their credences. Our attitudes toward the costs
of error determine how “risky” different credences are for us, and our epistemic states are
justified in part by our attitudes toward epistemic risk. Thus, reluctance to draw pernicious
predictive inferences need not be epistemically irrational, and the apparent conflict between
morality and epistemic rationality is typically illusory.
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1. Introduction
 
This paper brings good news.
 
To explain the good news, we first need to explain a bit of purported bad news. In 2011, Tamar
Gendler argued as follows:
As long as there’s a differential crime rate between racial groups, a perfectly rational
decision maker will manifest different behaviors, explicit and implicit, toward members
of different races. This is a profound cost: living in a society structured by race appears to
make it impossible to be both rational and equitable (p.57).
 
Gendler calls this “the sad conclusion” (Gendler 2011).
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It’s easy to understand Gendler’s concern. Many personal traits — such as prior criminal
convictions, low socioeconomic status, and certain medical conditions — are subject to profound
social stigma. And we often become aware of information about the base rates of these socially
disvalued traits within a certain (gender, racial, ethnic, etc.) group. It is natural to think that
epistemic rationality then requires us to revise our estimate of the probability that members of
the group whom we encounter possess the trait, in line with our information about the base rate
of the trait within the group. Many formal epistemologists would say, and many other theorists
assume, something stronger: that epistemic rationality requires us to match our estimates of the
probability that individual group members possess the trait to the base rates that we have so far
come across. 
Here is an example:
 
Gender Bias Study. One morning, in your usual newspaper (which you take to be
reliable), you read a report about a study on gender discrepancies in academic
employment. The study surveyed 500 men and 500 women employed by higher
education institutions similar to your local university. They found that only 30%
of the women were employed in faculty positions, while the other 70% were
administrative assistants. For men, the proportions were reversed: 70% were
faculty, and 30% were administrative assistants. You are intrigued by this, since,
before reading about the study, you had no information about the distribution of
employment roles across gender lines within higher education. It appears that the
study was conducted competently; the number of participants was stipulated in
advance, all identified covariates were tracked, no observations were excluded,
and so on. Later that day you meet Mary, a new neighbor. Mary tells you that she
is about to start working at your local university. But she does not tell you in what
capacity she is to be employed.
 
What should be your estimate of the probability that Mary is a faculty member?
 
Someone who accepts Gendler’s sad conclusion would say that this case involves a tragic
conflict between the requirements of epistemic rationality and those of morality. They would say
that epistemic rationality requires you to hold that Mary is 70% likely to be an administrative
assistant and 30% likely to be faculty. After all, these are the probabilities suggested by the study
you just learned about. And there is no reason to doubt its reliability. Moreover, you have no
other information bearing on the probability that a woman employed at your local university is a
faculty member besides the information that was reported in the study. Nonetheless, these
assumptions about Mary seem morally problematic. They reinforce cultural associations between
being a woman and being in low-paid, low-status jobs, fueling a hostile environment for working
women. They also might lead you to act in ways that wrong Mary (for example, by talking down
to her). And some philosophers think that we can wrong people just by believing negative things
about them (see e.g. Basu and Schroeder 2018), in which case presumably we can wrong people
to degrees by assigning degrees of belief to negative claims about them, which presumably holds
of your expectation that Mary is an administrative assistant rather than a faculty member. Thus
2
Moral Obligation and Epistemic Risk
we arrive at a conflict: it is impossible to meet both the requirements of epistemic rationality and
those of morality in your interaction with Mary. 
 
This example concerns gender and employment. Gendler’s example concerns race and crime
rates. But the structure of the problem is the same. Indeed, structurally similar problems arise for
all manner of social groups — based on religion, sexual orientation, disability, and so on — and
all sorts of socially disvalued traits. The sort of case we are interested in here is one in which
someone must estimate the probability that a particular person possesses a socially disvalued
trait, based on information about the prevalence of that trait within a sample of a group to which
the person belongs. In statistics, this required estimate is called a predictive inference. When
predictive inference requires someone to estimate that an individual they encounter is likely to
bear a socially disvalued trait, we will here call it a pernicious predictive inference. 
 
Here’s the good news: Gendler’s sad conclusion is false. It is false that there is a tragic conflict
between the requirements of epistemic rationality and those of morality in cases like Gender
Bias Study. This is because it is false that epistemic rationality requires you to assume that Mary
is 70% likely to be an administrative assistant and 30% likely to be faculty. Indeed, epistemic
rationality does not even require you to assume that Mary is more likely to be an administrative
assistant than to be faculty. More generally, pernicious predictive inferences are not epistemically
required. On the contrary, no particular attitude is required by epistemic rationality in these
cases. And the sort of epistemic behavior that seems morally good — that is, a reluctance to
draw pernicious predictive inferences about people based on information about the base rates of
socially disvalued traits in groups to which they belong — is epistemically permitted. So there
are all-things-considered normatively attractive options in cases like these; options on which
morality smiles, and at which rationality shrugs. Moreover, we can secure this result without
adopting a conception of epistemic rationality that is unfriendly toward Bayesian statistical
inference. On the contrary, we can show that pernicious predictive inferences are ordinarily not
epistemically required even from a classical Bayesian perspective on the requirements of
epistemic rationality, provided that we are clear about how such an approach measures and
evaluates accuracy. That is our task in this paper. 
 
This bit of good news is quite different from some other bits of good news that philosophers
have recently reported on this topic. We are far from being the first to discuss pernicious
predictive inferences; they have been subject to extensive discussion in philosophy of law for
many years, and have recently become a hot topic for philosophers interested in the relationship1
between moral and epistemic norms. Philosophers in this literature have already shown that there
are several ways in which pernicious predictive inferences may be epistemically problematic, as
well as morally problematic. For example, they may misrepresent the generality of a statistic
(Munton ms); they may lead to unhedged beliefs about an individual’s possessing a trait when
1  These discussions often focus on the probative value of statistical evidence in the courtroom, taking cues from
Kaplan (1968), and Tribe (1971). In the 1980’s, Cohen (1981)’s “Paradox of the Gatecrasher” generated renewed
interest in statistical evidence in courts, followed by Nesson (1985) on statistical evidence and liability for torts.
Around the same time, Thomson (1986) introduced the problem to philosophers. More recently, Enoch et al (2012)
explore epistemic issues pertaining to and legal evidence in detail, and Buchak (2013) evaluates what we are calling
pernicious predictive inferences in support of a version of the so-called “Lockean threshold” theory of belief.
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only a probabilistically hedged belief is warranted by the evidence (Gardiner ms); they may lead
people to form beliefs without ruling out salient alternatives, where the standard for what it takes
to rule out salient alternatives is raised by the morally charged nature of the case (Moss 2016,
Chapter 10); or they may lead people to form beliefs based on insufficient evidence, where the
threshold for sufficiency of evidence is raised by the morally charged nature of the case (Basu
2019). We do not challenge any of these arguments here. On the contrary, we take these
philosophers to have identified a promising range of ways to find epistemic fault with pernicious
predictive inferences. 
What is striking about these extant arguments is that all they all focus on the negative: they take
the sort of predictive inference that seems morally bad, and avoid the sad conclusion by arguing
that it is also epistemically prohibited. By contrast, we focus on the positive: we take the sort of
predictive inference that seems morally good, and vindicate its epistemic status. 
This is important in part because it provides a way to avoid the sad conclusion that has been
overlooked until now. But the sad conclusion is just as false if morally good predictive behavior
is epistemically permitted as it is if morally prohibited predictive behavior is epistemically
prohibited. The sad conclusion is that there is a tragic conflict between the requirements of
epistemic rationality and those of morality in cases like Gender Bias Study. This is false if it
turns out that rationality prohibits what morality prohibits, but equally false if it turns out that
rationality permits what morality requires. In either case, there is no conflict. 
 
Vindicating the epistemic status of morally praiseworthy inference is important for another
reason, too. In our current social context, the ideas that morally praiseworthy predictive behavior
is epistemically flawed is sometimes used as a smokescreen behind which prejudicial attitudes
hide. Prejudiced people sometimes try to give the impression that cold, calculating epistemic
rationality is on their side, and that reluctance to infer pernicious things about individuals based
on statistical information about groups to which they belong is a sign of weakness or a denial of
the “hard facts”. This suggestion is worth challenging in and of itself, irrespective of the merits
of other philosophical projects developing epistemic criticisms of pernicious predictive
inferences. We challenge the suggestion here. We hold that epistemic rationality permits morally
praiseworthy predictive behavior. Moreover, we hold that this is a straightforward consequence
of an intellectually honest Bayesian approach to epistemic rationality — i.e., one that is
transparent about the underlying evaluative commitments behind competing ways of measuring





The conception of epistemic rationality that we employ in this paper is a simple accuracy-based
account. This account’s central assumptions are that the attitude of belief comes in degrees,
which we can model using real numbers from 0 to 1 called credences, and that higher credences
are more accurate than lower ones if the proposition in question is true, while lower credences
are more accurate if it is false. On this approach, epistemic rationality requires that we form and
revise credences with the aim of minimizing inaccuracy. 
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We measure inaccuracy using a function called a scoring rule, whose inputs are credences and
outputs are “scores” of the credences’ inaccuracy. There is consensus in the literature that good
scoring rules have three properties: they are monotonic, continuous, and strictly proper. A
monotonic scoring rule assigns credences a progressively higher inaccuracy score as they get
progressively further from the truth. A continuous scoring rule is one whose scores increase
smoothly as credences get further from the truth, without any small changes to someone’s
credence resulting in big jumps in their inaccuracy score. And a strictly proper scoring rule is
one that, when used by an agent to compare her credences to others, always assesses her own
current credences as uniquely best in expected accuracy. Beyond these three core constraints,2
there is little consensus on optimal scoring rules, and we will not assume anything further. But
infinitely many scoring rules meet these three core constraints, and thus are acceptable from the
point of view of accuracy-based epistemology. When epistemologists need an example of a
kosher scoring rule, they often use squared Euclidean distance — a measure of inaccuracy
proposed by the meteorologist Glenn Brier for assessing weather forecasts, and now known as
the “Brier score”. However, the Brier score is only one instance of a more general family of
quadratic scoring rules. The Brier score, multiplied by any constant, would be likewise
continuous, monotonic, and strictly proper.
 
Accuracy-based epistemologists place two requirements on credences. The first is that, at any
point in time, an agent’s credences must obey the probability axioms. Consider a partition of
logical space: a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities. The probability
axioms state that an agent’s credence in the disjunction of any elements in a partition should be
equal to the sum of her credences in each disjunct — for example, Zoë’s credence that Boris is
either at the gym or at the department should be the sum of her credence that Boris is at the gym
and her credence that Boris is at the department — and moreover that her credences in all the
elements of a partition should together sum to 1. The probability axioms also state that each of an
agent’s credences should be greater than or equal to 0. We call agents whose credences obey the
probability axioms probabilistically coherent. Joyce (2009) vindicates the accuracy-based
epistemologist’s preference for probabilistically coherent credences by proving that, for any
incoherent credence function, there is a coherent one that is guaranteed to have a better accuracy
score no matter which proposition turns out to be true, according to any scoring rule that is
monotonic, continuous, and strictly proper. For epistemic agents who aim to minimize
inaccuracy, then, coherent credences are always a better bet than incoherent ones.
 
The second central requirement within accuracy-based epistemology is that agents update their
credences by Bayesian conditionalization. For example, suppose you learn that someone rolled a
regular six-sided die. Your credence that it landed on 6 is 1/6. But if you were to learn that it
2 An improper scoring rule always assesses another set of credences as better than the agent’s current credences —
but if she were to switch to this other set, then the improper scoring rule would immediately assess yet another set of
credences as better, such that if someone revised her credences following an improper scoring rule then her
credences could never remain stable. This seems bad. A proper scoring rule assesses some other sets of credences as
equally as good as the agent’s current credences. This avoids the instability problem, but it licenses agents’
randomly switching to an entirely different set of credences without any change in their evidence. This also seems
bad. Hence the preference for strict propriety.
5
Moral Obligation and Epistemic Risk
landed on an even number, your credence that it landed on 6 would increase to 1/3. This 1/3
credence that the die landed on a 6, given that it landed on an even number, is called a
conditional credence. To update by Bayesian conditionalization is to respond to new information
(e.g. that the die landed on an even number) by shifting your prior credence in a proposition (e.g.
your 1/6 credence that the die landed on 6) to your prior conditional credence in the proposition,
conditional on the information that you just learned (e.g. your 1/3 credence that the die landed on
6, given that it landed on an even number). Just as Joyce has vindicated probabilistic coherence,
Greaves and Wallace (2006) have shown that updating by conditionalization minimizes the prior
expected inaccuracy of an agent’s posterior credences, according to any scoring rule that is
monotonic, continuous, and strictly proper. This means that the best strategy for an agent who
aims to minimize inaccuracy when responding to new evidence is to update by Bayesian
conditionalization.
 
To see how this approach understands predictive inference, consider the formal epistemologist’s
favorite illustrative example: a coin of an unknown bias. Suppose that Zoë is about to toss a coin,
and Boris must guess whether it will land Heads. Boris knows that the probability of the coin
landing Heads depends on its weight distribution and associated center of gravity; it might be a
fair coin, with its weight distributed such that it lands heads 50% of the time, or it might be
biased such that it lands heads 80% of the time, or 20%, etc. Boris doesn’t know the coin’s
weight distribution. But he can assign credences to a range of hypotheses about the value of this
unknown parameter. The possible values range from 0 (0% Heads) to 1 (100% heads), so Boris
can distribute his credence over this range of hypotheses. For example, here are two possible
distributions:
Fig. 1: Two probability distributions for coin’s unknown bias
 
The distribution on the left is uniform: it assigns the same probability to every hypothesis about
the coin’s bias. The one on the right is non-uniform: it assigns some hypotheses a higher
probability than others. But both distributions meet all the requirements of epistemic rationality
on an accuracy-based approach.
 
When Boris makes a prediction about the probability that Zoë’s coin toss will land Heads, he
takes the mean of his current credal distribution over hypotheses about the underlying bias of the
coin. For the distribution in the left panel in Fig. 1, the mean is 0.5, so Boris will guess that the
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coin is equally as likely to land Heads as it is to land Tails. For the distribution in the right panel,
the mean is 0.7, so Boris will guess that the coin is about 70% likely to land Heads and 30%
likely to land Tails.
 
Suppose that Boris sees Zoë toss the coin a few times, and sees whether it lands Heads or Tails
each time. This gives him some data to use in his estimate of the coin’s bias. Now, there’s a
heuristic we can employ to explain how Boris’ credal distribution over hypotheses about the bias
should change if he updates by Bayesian conditionalization: each probability distribution
corresponds to a pair of numbers of Heads tosses and Tails tosses, as if Boris had set his initial
credal distribution based on having observed precisely these numbers of tosses. For example, the
uniform distribution in the left panel of Fig. 1 corresponds to one Heads toss and one Tails toss,
while the distribution in the right panel corresponds to 7 Heads tosses and 3 Tails tosses. If he
updates by Bayesian conditionalization, Boris’ posterior credal distribution will correspond to
the pair of numbers that would result from adding the number of Heads tosses that he actually
observes to these “pseudo” initial Heads tosses, and then adding the number of Tails tosses that
he actually observes to the “pseudo” initial Tails tosses. For example, if Boris were to start with
the distribution in the right panel of Fig. 1, and then to observe 5 further Heads tosses and 3 Tails
tosses, then his posterior distribution would correspond to 7+5 Heads and 3+3 Tails tosses. 
The following diagrams show how the two distributions would shift after observing 5 Heads and
3 Tails:
 
Fig. 2: The probability distributions following conditionalization
 
The mean of the distribution in the left panel shifts from 0.5 to 0.6, while that of the distribution
in the right panel shifts from 0.7 to 0.66. This is because in the left panel, we started with an
attitude of weak indifference between all hypotheses, and we updated that attitude on a sequence
of experiments in which a slight majority of heads was observed. Thus, the experiments nudged
us up toward expecting that the coin is biased toward Heads. Meanwhile, in the right panel, we
started with a strong hunch that the coin is significantly biased toward Heads, which we updated
on a sequence of experiments that is only slightly dominated by Heads. Thus the experiments
nudged us down toward suspecting a less extreme Heads bias. Thus the two agents’ credences
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change by different amounts, and in different directions, in a way that reflects updating by
Bayesian conditionalization on the evidence observed. 
Gender Bias Study is analogous to the coin toss example. There is an unknown parameter,
analogous to the unknown bias of the coin: the actual proportion of women employed at
universities who are faculty as opposed to administrative assistants. Before reading about the
study, you have no information about the value of this unknown parameter. But you know that it
must have some value between 0 (0% faculty) and 1 (100% faculty), just as Boris knows the
range of possibilities about the coin’s bias. So you can distribute your credence over hypotheses
about the value of this unknown parameter, just as Boris does. This prior probability distribution
will correspond to a pair of numbers representing pseudo-“observations” — to put things less
oddly (if it is any less odd) we might think of them as hypothetical prior encounters — of women
employed at universities who are faculty and of women employed at universities who are
administrative assistants. When you read about the study, you gain data to use in your estimate of
the value of the unknown parameter. Updating by conditionalization will then move you to the
posterior probability distribution corresponding to the pair of numbers that result from adding the
number of women faculty reported in the study to your pseudo-observations of women faculty
and adding the number of women administrative assistants reported in the study to your
pseudo-observations of women administrative assistants. As with the coin toss, at any point in
time your predictive estimate of the probability that the next woman employed at a university
whom you meet will be a faculty member is the mean of your probability distribution at that
time.
 
This is already enough to see why Gendler’s sad conclusion is false. But let us explain more
carefully why this is the case.
 
The reasoning behind the sad conclusion depends on this principle:
 
Frequency-Credence Connection: If (a) I know that a is an F, and (b) I know that x% of
previously sampled Fs are G, and (c) I have no further evidence bearing on
whether a is G, then my credence that a is G should be x.
 
This is a popular principle. Contemporary formal epistemologists continue to defend it and apply
it to cases like Gender Bias Study (see e.g. White 2010, Buchak 2013). But the principle has
roots in some highly influential early work in probability theory (see e.g. Reichenbach 1938,
1949; Kyburg 1974). The frequency-credence connection states that we should conform our
credences to observed frequencies when making predictive inferences; for example, that we
should have credence 0.3 that Mary will be a faculty member based on the reported results of the
study.
 
The frequency-credence connection cannot be a genuine principle of epistemic rationality. This
is because, given the way predictive inference works, agents can only adopt the posterior
credence that this principle recommends if they had a prior credal distribution that violates the
probability axioms. Posterior credences usually depend on two things: an observed frequency,
and the agent’s prior credences. But the frequency-credence connection requires that an agent’s
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posterior credence exactly equal the observed frequency. This principle thus requires that her
prior credences have no influence on her posterior credences; in other words, it requires her to
behave as if she had no prior. Of course, an agent cannot actually have no prior – or, if she did,
then she could not engage in Bayesian conditionalization at all, as she would have nothing to
update. Now, it turns out that there is one prior credal distribution that exerts no weight on the
posterior and thus allows agents to behave as if they had no prior. However, for mathematical
reasons that we will not go into here, there is only one of these, and it looks quite strange: its
graph is a U-shaped parabola over the interval [0,1], which increases arbitrarily as it approaches
the extremal credal values of 0 and 1. The area under this parabola is infinite, since the graph3
approaches 0 and 1 only at the limit. But this violates the probability axioms. For the axioms
require that an agent’s credences sum to 1, not infinity. Such a prior is therefore irrational.
Some credences that do not sum to 1 can be saved from irrationality using a standard trick in
probability theory: we can transform incoherent credences into coherent ones using a
normalizing constant by which we multiply all the credences. For example, if someone’s
credences in the elements of a partition sum to 3 rather than 1, then we can “normalize” them by
multiplying them all by ⅓. But the “U”-shaped prior that a Bayesian agent would have to adopt
in order to respect the frequency-credence connection cannot be rescued in this way, since there
is no real number such that when we divide infinity by that number we get 1. (In other words,
there is no reciprocal to infinity.) Thus, the prior credal distribution that agents would need to
adopt in order to respect the frequency-credence connection requires them to be irremediably
probabilistically incoherent. This sort of reasoning is therefore prohibited even by the minimal
principles of epistemic rationality that accuracy-based epistemology endorses. 
 
So, how should we make predictive inferences?
 
On our accuracy-based conception of the requirements of epistemic rationality, this question
does not have a single correct answer. That is because no single prior credal distribution is
uniquely required by epistemic rationality. Rather, many such distributions are epistemically
permitted, and different agents may adopt different ones according to their attitudes toward
epistemic risk.
 
Someone’s attitude toward epistemic risk reflects the way she thinks about the two types of
epistemic error: high credence in a falsehood and low credence in a truth. One of the
fundamental tenets of accuracy-based epistemology is that high credences in falsehoods and low
credences in truths are bad. But this says nothing about the relative badness of the two types of
error. In formal circles, one often hears that the platitude that we should pursue the “Jamesian
goals” of believing truths and disbelieving falsehoods does not tell us how to prioritize these4
goals. Thus, someone may think that approaching error in the false positive direction — by
increasing one’s credence in a falsehood — is always equally as bad as approaching error in the
false negative direction — by decreasing one’s credence in a truth — if the increase and decrease
4 So called because they are traced to James (1896).
3 We can also think informally about how weird this prior is. Someone with this prior is virtually certain that the
value of the unknown parameter is not 0.5, and is infinitely confident both that it is somewhere close to 1 and that it
is somewhere close to 0.
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are in equal amount. But someone may equally well think that one of these types of error is
worse than the other. And someone might think that which type of error is worse (if any) depends
on the proposition in question. For example, weather forecasters may reasonably be more
worried about low credence in truths than high credence in falsehoods if the proposition in
question is that a tornado is nearby, since a false alarm would be inconvenient but failing to
predict a tornado would be disastrous. In this case, the forecaster understands that false negatives
are worse than false positives. Moreover, as this example shows, we assess the disvalue of the
two types of epistemic error based on non-alethic concerns. The forecaster does not have an
intrinsic aversion to false negatives. Rather, her asymmetric attitudes to the costs of error are
based on her understanding of the practical costs involved in the case. But this is fully
compatible with the requirements of epistemic rationality on an accuracy-based approach; it does
not lead her to violate any of the aforementioned requirements.
 
Following Babic (2019), we can model agents as having an epistemic risk function, whose inputs
are credences in propositions and whose outputs are numbers representing the agent’s assessment
of the “riskiness” of this credence in this proposition. Whenever anyone assigns a credence to a
proposition, she “risks” being penalized with a certain inaccuracy score if her credence turns out
to be far from the truth — that is, a low credence in a falsehood or a high credence in a truth.
Thus different credences will seem more or less “risky” to different agents, depending on their
view of the relative disvalue of the two types of epistemic error. For example, the weather
forecaster regards errors in the false negative direction as much more serious than errors in the
false positive direction for the proposition that there is a tornado nearby, so she will see lower
credences as “riskier” than higher ones. She thus evaluates epistemic risk asymmetrically. By
contrast, someone who sees the two types of error as equally bad will evaluate epistemic risk
symmetrically. This means that she will assess low and high credences as equally risky, provided
that they deviate from 0.5 by an equal amount. For example, she will see credence 0.2 and 0.8 as
equally risky.
In Babic (2019), one of us has shown that epistemic risk functions meeting a handful of intuitive
criteria are uniquely associated with monotonic, continuous, and strictly proper scoring rules.
This result suggests that, since the requirements of epistemic rationality are not specific enough
to pin down a single correct scoring rule, the agent may choose among them based on her
attitude toward epistemic risk.
An agent’s attitude toward epistemic risk can also rationalize her choice of a credal distribution
over hypotheses about the value of an unknown parameter — like the bias of a coin, or the
proportion of women employed at universities who are faculty — before she gains any evidence
about it. This is because, before gaining evidence about some proposition, agents can prefer
some credences to others on the basis that they minimize epistemic risk. The least risky credence
is the one that guarantees the agent a certain inaccuracy score no matter whether the proposition
in question turns out to be true or false.
To see how this applies in cases like Gender Bias Study, consider someone whose way of
thinking about predictive inference seems morally good: someone who holds that mistakes in the
false negative direction are worse than mistakes in the false positive direction when the
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proposition in question is that Mary is a faculty member (call this proposition ‘m’). For clarity,
suppose that this person’s epistemic risk function is as follows, with credences in the proposition
that Mary is faculty along the x-axis and her assessment of those credences’ riskiness along the
y-axis:
Fig. 3: An asymmetric epistemic risk function
This attitude toward epistemic risk can help the agent to choose a prior credal distribution over
hypotheses about the proportion of women employed at universities who are faculty before she
reads about the study. For someone who assessed the costs of error symmetrically, her prior
credal distribution would have to be the uniform distribution depicted in the left panel of Figure
1. This is because, for such a person, the unique credence that minimizes epistemic risk is 0.5,
and the uniform distribution is the only one with this mean. But our agent has more options.
Given the epistemic risk function depicted in Figure 3, the minimally risky credence is 0.7 —
this is the credence such that the agent is guaranteed the same inaccuracy score whether the
proposition in question turns out to be true or false. Thus our agent should adopt a prior credal
distribution whose mean is 0.7, so as to minimize epistemic risk. But very many credal
distributions have this mean. For example, one is the distribution corresponding to 100
pseudo-observations of women administrative assistants and 300 pseudo-observations of women
faculty. So our agent might adopt this prior distribution over possible values of the unknown
parameter, justified by her attitude toward epistemic risk. Such a prior distribution would look
like this:
11
Moral Obligation and Epistemic Risk
Fig. 4: Probability distribution licensed by the attitude toward epistemic risk depicted in Fig. 3
Now consider what happens when our agent reads about the study. The newspaper reports that
the study “observed” 350 women employed as administrative assistants and 150 employed as
faculty. If our agent updates by Bayesian conditionalization, then she will move to the posterior
distribution corresponding to 100+350 encounters with women administrative assistants and
300+150 encounters with women faculty. Her prior (light blue) and posterior (dark blue)
distributions are represented in the right panel of Figure 5. For comparison, the left panel shows
a pair of possible prior and posterior distributions for someone who sees the two types of error as
almost equally disvaluable, in response to the exact same evidence; this person begins with a
weak prior centered around 0.5, and when she updates by conditionalization she will move to a
credal distribution that is approximately equal to 350 encounters with women who are
administrative assistants and 150 encounters with women who are faculty. 
 
Fig. 5: Two probability distributions before (light blue) and after (dark blue) conditionalization
Here the person who thinks that the costs of error are symmetric will end up, after
conditionalizing on the results of the study, with a credal distribution such that she thinks Mary is
very unlikely to be faculty. The mean of her distribution is now 0.31, so that will be her credence
that Mary is a faculty member — not far from the 0.3 recommended by the Frequency-Credence
Connection. This person thus displays precisely the sort of epistemic behavior that seems to
wrong Mary. But that is not so for the person who thinks that the costs of error are asymmetric.
The mean of her credal distribution after conditionalizing on the results of the study is 0.5, so she
will judge Mary exactly equally as likely to be faculty as she is to be an administrative assistant.
To emphasize: our agent depicted in the right panel of Fig. 5 is doing just as well, epistemically
speaking, as the person who assesses the costs of error symmetrically and displays the updating
behavior shown in the left panel. Our agent’s credences obey the probability axioms throughout.
She updates by conditionalization. And she assesses expected accuracy using a monotonic,
continuous, and strictly proper scoring rule. Thus, she meets all of the requirements of epistemic
rationality. But our agent avoids leaping to the conclusion that Mary is probably an
administrative assistant solely on the basis of the information in the study. Thus, she avoids
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doing what is morally problematic, without doing anything that is epistemically prohibited. She
shows that it is indeed possible to be both rational and equitable. She shows, then, that the Sad
Conclusion is false.
  
Many formal epistemologists who endorse the frequency-credence connection would disagree
with us on this last point. This is because they think that, before someone gains any evidence
about which of a set of hypotheses is true, epistemic rationality requires that she be “indifferent”
between these hypotheses — where this “indifference” is construed as a uniform distribution like
that in the left panel of figure 1. (On this see e.g. White 2010). One often hears that a uniform
distribution represents indifference because it is “neutral” as to the truth or falsehood of the
proposition in question. But that is a mistake. The uniform distribution is not neutral at all. On
the contrary, a uniform distribution corresponds to a precise number of pseudo-“observations”,
just as any other distribution does. And a uniform distribution reflects a maximally specific
attitude toward the relative costs of the two types of epistemic error, just as any other distribution
does: this distribution corresponds to an epistemic risk function according to which the two types
of epistemic error are exactly equally bad.
To be clear: we agree that the uniform distribution is epistemically permitted. We deny that it is
epistemically privileged. Someone may hold this attitude toward epistemic error, but she had
better have an argument for it, since there is excellent reason to think that the two types of error
are not exactly equally bad in this case — viz., all the moral and political reasons to think that
one type of error is significantly worse than the other. Moreover, there are epistemically
permitted attitudes toward epistemic risk that take proper account of these moral costs. If
someone eschews these all-things-considered normatively attractive epistemic options, and
instead insists on assessing the costs of error symmetrically, then we hold that the problem with
this person is not that they are epistemically irrational but simply that they are a jerk.
It may be tempting at this point to object on the grounds that bringing moral and political costs
into the assessment of epistemic rationality is inappropriate. But our point is that there is no way
to avoid this. One cannot give a purely alethic story for why the two types of error are to be
treated equally; this is what epistemologists acknowledge when they talk of different ways to
balance the “Jamesian goals”. In other words, to claim that the two types of error are equally
costly is not to avoid taking a moral or political position — it is itself a moral or political
position. While it may look like the “default” option, it is not. In the absence of any information,
a uniform distribution is no more plausible than any other maximally specific distribution.
At this point we should clarify a possible misconception. We are not saying that it is
epistemically permissible for someone’s attitude toward epistemic risk to be such that she will
never reach the point where she thinks that the next member of a certain social group whom she
meets is more likely than not to possess a certain socially disvalued trait. We have not argued
that every possible attitude toward epistemic risk is epistemically permissible. Nor, equivalently,
do we hold that every possible prior probability distribution is epistemically permissible. Rather,
we hold that a wide range of attitudes toward epistemic risk are epistemically permissible, and
that the same goes for a corresponding range of probability distributions. This range includes
several attitudes and priors that do not lead the agent to draw the pernicious predictive inference
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in Gender Bias Study. What exactly the bounds of this range are remains an open question that
we do not intend to settle here. And, for each permissible attitude toward epistemic risk, there is
a quantity of evidence that the agent could in theory obtain that would shift her probability
distribution over possible values of the unknown parameter to the point where its mean is above
0.5. So, our picture of epistemic rationality does not instruct agents to simply ignore their
evidence for moral and political reasons. Rather, for each agent, there may come a point where
she will take the next group member whom she meets to be more likely than not to possess the
relevant socially disvalued trait. But our morally virtuous agents reach this point more slowly
than the “neutral” ones, and it takes more evidence to get them there. Their attitudes toward the
differential costs of false positive and false negative errors ensure that they need a lot more
evidence than others do before they begin to expect members of a certain social group to bear
socially disvalued traits solely on the basis of information about the prevalence of those traits
within the group.  5
 
One might take this last point to show that the requirements of epistemic rationality and those of
morality do inevitably conflict after all. But we think that this would be a mistake. That is
because it is unclear precisely what morality requires in cases like Gender Bias Study. We
stipulatively introduced the label “pernicious predictive inference” above, but it is far from clear
that all inferences of this type are pernicious, and in some cases they may be morally required.
This is because, while there are good moral reasons to be reluctant to assume that Mary is an
administrative assistant based solely on the information in the study, there are further moral
reasons not to exhibit such reluctance, or at least to limit its scope. For one thing, reluctance to
assume that people are administrative assistants reinforces the idea that there is something bad
about being an administrative assistant. There are moral reasons to avoid assuming that women
and minorities hold low-status jobs, but there are also moral reasons to question the status of
these jobs, affording so-called “women’s work” its proper value. This generalizes; many socially
disvalued traits that are statistically prevalent in marginalized social groups are disvalued (at
least in part) because of their association with these groups. In such cases, we have moral reason
not to act as if possessing the trait is a bad thing, and thus not to exhibit reluctance to draw
predictive inferences about it. Moreover, there is something sanctimonious and disingenuous6
about refusing ever to expect any members of any marginalized groups to bear any socially
disvalued traits, regardless of what we learn about the prevalence of the traits within the groups.
Just as “color-blind” policies can make us overlook the contemporary effects of historical racial
injustices, similarly this extreme predictive reluctance can make us fail to respond adequately to
the fact that someone belongs to a social group in which a disvalued trait is highly prevalent,
ignoring the ways in which this fact impacts the person’s life. So it seems to us highly likely that,
6 Thanks to Pauline Kleingeld for pressing us on this point.
5  We are grateful to Kenny Walden for encouraging us to clarify this point. It is also worth noting that this point
makes our approach roughly analogous to Basu (2019)’s “moral encroachment” approach to pernicious predictive
inference, but for credal states rather than full beliefs. On both Basu’s approach and our own, moral and political
considerations affect the quantity of evidence that someone must acquire before she draws a pernicious inference.
However, our approach differs from Basu’s in its interpersonal permissivism; Basu’s approach entails that, for
certain bodies of evidence and sets of moral or political costs, all agents are prohibited from drawing pernicious
predictive inferences (regardless of their attitudes toward epistemic risk), whereas our approach merely entails that
some agents are permitted to refrain from drawing the pernicious predictive inferences (given their attitudes toward
epistemic risk).
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in each real-life case, morality calls for a less-than-maximal degree of predictive reluctance. We
assume that the attitude toward epistemic risk that yields this morally optimal degree of
predictive reluctance falls within the range of epistemically permissible attitudes toward
epistemic risk. 
3. Other Types of Statistical Inference
This paper has so far focused on predictive inference: an assessment of the probability that an
individual possesses a certain trait, based on information about the trait’s prevalence among
previously observed members of a group to which that individual belongs. But this is not the
only kind of inference someone can perform on the basis of information about the prevalence of
a socially disvalued trait within a certain social group. In cases like Gender Bias Study, the
agent is using information about observed frequencies among other group members to make a
prediction about a new group member whom she encounters. In another kind of statistical
inference, called direct inference, the agent makes a prediction about someone in the very sample
from which the observed frequency was taken. For example, Gender Bias Study would be a
case of direct inference if you knew that Mary was one of the people interviewed for the study.
In some cases of direct inference, the agent’s credence that the encountered group member
possesses the trait is, after all, epistemically required to be equal to the observed frequency of the
trait within the group. This is so under conditions of exchangeability, in which the agent has no
information about group members that makes any of them more or less likely to possess the trait
than any others. But when it comes to real-life cases of direct inference, such conditions are
extremely rare. In all of the real-life cases that worry philosophers and legal scholars, conditions
of exchangeability do not hold. That is because the agents in these cases all encounter people in
such a way as to learn a lot of information about them that either raises or lowers the probability
that they possess the trait. For example, in Gender Bias Study you not only learn that Mary is a
woman, but that she lives in your area and has a certain appearance. This means that she is not
just as likely to be a faculty member as any other woman from the study, based on your
information. Since genuine conditions of exchangeability are vanishingly rare in real-life cases,
we are not worried about direct inference. The circumstances in which someone could be
epistemically required to conform her credences to observed population frequencies are possible,
but extremely unlikely to arise.
Another thing one can do based on information about the prevalence of a socially disvalued trait
within a certain social group is accept the statistic. For instance, in Gender Bias Study, you can
accept that 70% of women employed at universities like your local university are administrative
assistants and only 30% are faculty. Or you can accept that these were the proportions found in a
sample of such women. Or, if you are in a more skeptical mood, you can accept that a study
found that these were the proportions in a sample of such women, or that a newspaper reported
that this is what the study found.
There is no epistemic requirement to assume that the overall frequency of a trait in a population
is equal to the frequency that one hears that a study found in a sample of that population. (This is
why statistical information about the prevalence of a trait within a sample can inform an agent’s
15
Moral Obligation and Epistemic Risk
probability distribution over possible values of the actual population frequency — the “unknown
parameter’’ discussed above — but does not dictate precisely what her estimate of this value
should be.) So there is no epistemic requirement to accept statistics in this sense. But some
related epistemic requirements do hold. The agent in  Gender Bias Study cannot simply ignore
the information that she hears, revising none of her doxastic states. On the contrary, she has
gained new evidence, and she must decide what her evidence is and respond accordingly. If there
is reason to doubt the study’s validity (e.g. because it used a small sample, or excluded
observations that should not have been excluded) then she may take her evidence to be that  a
study found evidence of a certain population frequency rather than that  there  is a certain
population frequency. And if there is reason to doubt the newspaper’s reliability (e.g. because it
has a track record of inaccurately reporting scientific studies) then she may take her evidence to
be that  a newspaper  reported  that a study found evidence of  a certain population frequency.
Similarly, if she has reason to be even more skeptical, then she might take her evidence to be that
 she had a series of sensory experiences as of a newspaper reporting that a study found evidence
of  a c ertain population frequency. But she must start somewhere. This is how responding to
evidence works; we update our credences by conditionalizing on what we have learned, and
conditionalization begins with the agent identifying something that she has learned.
Again, one might think that this point supports the Sad Conclusion after all. But that would be a
mistake. This point supports the Sad Conclusion only if there are statistics that we are both
epistemically required to accept and morally prohibited from accepting. And, again, these appear
to be vanishingly rare. Indeed, when statistics about population samples from well-designed
studies are reported by credible sources, accepting them may be morally  required. This is
because we are morally required to resist the structural injustices that underlie and explain these
statistical facts, and we cannot do so effectively without informing ourselves of the facts. For
example, we cannot address the structural problems underlying incarceration rates among
contemporary African-Americans without accepting information about what those rates are.
Similarly, when there is reason to distrust the source of a piece of statistical information,
someone may still be morally required to accept that the source reported the information. For
example, we cannot address the structural problems underlying incarceration rates among
contemporary African-Americans if we ignore information about how these rates are reported,
particularly if public reports are systematically misleading. Thus the Sad Conclusion is, again,
false: there is no tension between the requirements of epistemic rationality and those of morality.
Rather, the sort of epistemic behavior that might be rationally required — accepting data about
the prevalence of pernicious traits within samples of social groups, or information about how
such data is reported — is at least morally permitted, and may sometimes be morally required.
4. Conclusion
We have argued that Gendler’s “sad conclusion” is false: there is no inevitable conflict between
the requirements of epistemic rationality and those of morality, on a standard Bayesian construal
of the requirements of epistemic rationality. We agree with Gendler that the “neutral” attitude
(corresponding to a uniform prior) is criticizable on moral and political grounds. We do not think
that it is criticizable on epistemic grounds. But we have argued that there are a family of attitudes
toward epistemic risk that are not criticizable on either grounds. These are attitudes that render
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the agent slow to draw pernicious predictive inferences, while remaining consistent with the
requirements of epistemic rationality. So there are plenty of all-things-considered normatively
attractive options in cases like Gender Bias Study; that is, plenty of options that allow us to
combine being rational with being equitable. This means that prejudiced people cannot claim that
cold, calculating epistemic rationality is on their side; properly understood, it is easy to see that it
isn’t.
We stated at the outset that our approach is intended to complement, rather than challenge,
existing ways of avoiding the Sad Conclusion. But there is something positive to be said for our
approach. As we noted earlier, it is striking that existing approaches all attempt to secure the
strong result that, in at least some cases like Gender Bias Study, the kind of predictive inference
that seems morally unsavory is also epistemically prohibited. To secure this strong result, some
existing approaches apply only to certain cases of pernicious predictive inference — those in
which the agent makes a particular epistemic error. And others apply to all cases, but do so by
incorporating a substantial amount of contentious theoretical machinery that complicates our
understanding of the requirements of epistemic rationality. Meanwhile, we are able to vindicate
the option to be slow to draw pernicious predictive inferences in cases like Gender Bias Study,
by showing that, as well as being morally desirable, such predictive behavior need not be
epistemically irrational. And our approach secures this weaker result by locating the point at
which moral, political, and other practical considerations already factor in to a simple
accuracy-based understanding of the requirements of epistemic rationality: these considerations
are the basis for agents’ assessments of the relative costs of the two types of epistemic error, thus
determining her attitude toward epistemic risk. This means that our approach applies in all cases
and requires no contentious additional theoretical machinery. We take this to be a significant
advantage of our approach: it is (arguably) the most minimal, and thus (hopefully!) the least
controversial, way of avoiding the Sad Conclusion.
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